North Carolina and the federal government are suing each other over whether the state's new transgender bathroom regulation violates federal civil rights laws. The cultural stakes are clear: the two governments have sharply different ideas about the acceptance of transgender people. But what about the legal stakes?
The legal problem in the case is whether the North Carolina law, which bars transgender people from restrooms, locker rooms and changing rooms, violates the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex.
That question may sound simple, but it's actually profound. It will require a court to decide whether gender is the same thing as sex, and if so, for what purposes.
If this makes your head spin, let me start with a clarification of terminology that might make things worse before they can get better.
In academic discourse today, it's become conventional to distinguish between two conceptual categories, sex and gender.
"Sex" is (mostly) biological. Some combination of chromosomes (your genotype) and characteristics (your phenotype) determine whether to categorize you male, female, or intersex.
In contrast, "gender" is mostly treated as a social or cultural category of presentation, identity and self-description. The influential literary theorist Judith Butler famously called this "gender performance."
The idea is that a person born with X and Y chromosomes and male secondary sexual characteristics could still present herself as a woman by means of speech, dress, manner and more. That person's gender would be female while the same person's sex could be male.