America needs more low-down-payment loans.
That seems to be the opinion of our government, anyway. The government agencies that drive most of the housing market are pushing for lower down-payment standards on mortgages, easing the 20 percent requirement that has become standard for much of the market.
The Center for American Progress approves: "We shouldn't obsess about down payments," said Julia Gordon, director of housing policy. "Research confirms that low-down-payment loans to lower-wealth borrowers perform very well if the mortgages are well-underwritten, safe and sustainable."
This depends, of course, on what you think "perform very well" means. A low-down-payment loan made to someone with a good credit rating and a low debt-to-income ratio will perform better than a low-down-payment loan made to someone with terrible credit and a lot of debt. But it has a higher default risk than a mortgage made to a similar borrower with an adequate down payment, because when you start out with little equity, you're apt to find yourself in foreclosure if you get into financial trouble.
I'm with Arnold Kling, a member of the Mercatus Center's Financial Markets Working Group at George Mason University, which favors a free market:
"There is simply no way to make low down payment lending stable in any environment otherthan in a rising house price environment. The [Center of American Progress's] study says it covers the last decade. If you made a low down payment loan in 2001, there was enough of a price increase after that you're probably fine. But it only works in that environment and it creates this cycle of a boom as house prices are rising, and then once they stop rising everybody crashes. You get this epidemic of foreclosures. It destabilizes the entire market."
Is there a good public-policy reason to encourage people to make a heavily leveraged bet on continued upward movement in home prices? Presumably, the argument is that many homeowners have done very well out of this over the past 50 years; rising home values sowed the seeds of many a college education and retirement fund.
But there are huge drawbacks to housing, too. Leveraged bets are great when they pay off; when they don't, they leave you dead broke. Especially a bet on a large, illiquid asset such as a house. Put a homeowner into one of these gambles at the age of 35, send the local housing and job markets south a few years later, and the end result is a broke middle-age person with trashed credit in desperate need of a good rental unit. Which legislators should know, because we seem to have a lot of them around right now.