With his bellicose bombast, theatrical gestures and dodgy jokes, Hugo Chavez, Venezuela's president for the past 11 years, has turned himself into one of the world's most recognizable and controversial rulers. His fans salute him as a savior for the downtrodden of the planet, a man who is leading a grass-roots revolution against American imperialism. But to many others he has come to embody a new, post-Cold War model of authoritarian rule that combines a democratic mandate, populist socialism and anti-Americanism, as well as resource nationalism and carefully calibrated repression.
This model has proved surprisingly successful across the world. Versions are to be found in countries as disparate and distinct as Iran, Russia, Zimbabwe and Sudan. In one way or another, these regimes claim to have created a viable alternative to liberal democracy.
In Chavez's case, that claim has been backed up above all by oil. On the one hand, he has deployed oil revenue abroad to gain allies, and to sustain the Castro brothers in power in Cuba. On the other, having kicked out Western multinationals, he has signed investment deals with state-owned oil companies. Last month China agreed to lend Venezuela $20 billion, mainly for oil development. Chavez has armed his revolution with Russian jets, tanks and rifles. Meanwhile, a Spanish judge accuses his government of sheltering members of ETA, the Basque terrorist group. Intercepted e-mails from leaders of Colombia's FARC guerrillas suggest that they have received help, and possibly arms, through Venezuela. Of course Venezuela's government denies such claims. So just how much of a menace is Chavez, and what, if anything, can be done about him?
Certainly his threats against Colombia -- which include a total trade embargo if Juan Manuel Santos, a former defense minister, wins this month's presidential election -- and the evidence of his veiled support for the FARC are troubling. They are a constant, if manageable, source of regional tension.
Much more important is the damage Chavez is doing to his own country. His "21st-century socialism" is a precarious construction. The brief fall in the oil price of 2008-09 was enough to sink Venezuela's economy into stagflation -- even as the rest of Latin America is enjoying vigorous economic recovery. Venezuelans are suffering declining real wages, persistent shortages of staple goods and daily power cuts.
The blackouts are in part the result of drought. But they are also the most dramatic sign that the bill for a decade of mismanagement of the economy and of public services is now falling due. Investors rate the country's debt as the riskiest of anywhere, and crime and corruption are flourishing.
Bad timing for Hugo
Awkwardly for Chavez, all this is happening when he faces a legislative election in September, the prelude to a vital presidential ballot in December 2012. That points to the contradiction at the heart of his project. He sees his revolution as permanent and irreversible. But he derives his legitimacy from the ballot box. He has been elected three times, and won four referendums. He has hollowed out Venezuela's democracy, subjugating the courts, bullying the media and intimidating opponents. But he has been unable, or unwilling, to disregard or repress opposition to the same degree as Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, let alone the Castros in Cuba.
