WASHINGTON - The international shipment of thousands of wireless networking components in October 2007 seemed suspicious, so the U.S. Commerce Department started asking questions.
The Minnesota manufacturer didn't have many answers. The buyers wouldn't reveal the parts' destination. Then they said Singapore. A month later, the Philippines.
The end user and intended use of the parts were also mysterious. First, the buyers claimed a nondisclosure agreement. Pressed, they named an electronics firm and a Singapore telecom project.
Despite the warning signs, the government lacked proof of criminal intent. So it released the shipment.
Six weeks later the parts were in Iran being put into improvised explosive devices (IEDs) meant to kill U.S. military men and women in Iraq.
This sequence of events, described in a federal indictment, exposes potentially deadly holes in the U.S. export control system, experts say. It took four years, until October 2011, for the government to arrest four people. U.S. authorities have yet to get the accused terrorist suppliers transferred to this country to face trial.
But, experts add, reforms currently under consideration likely can't fill those holes without also throwing sand in the gears of international trade.
"What we're talking about here are low-level things that aren't controlled and shouldn't be," said Ben Flowe of Washington's Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe law firm. "The difficulty is trying to do what's effective and what doesn't burden the 99 percent of law-abiding activities."