Bert Lance, President Jimmy Carter's first director of the Office of Management and Budget, managed fewer than nine months in that post before resigning. Mack McLarty, President Bill Clinton's first White House chief of staff, was twice as successful as Lance, if success is measured by tenure. McLarty lasted 14 months in the seat Reince Priebus occupies today.
President Donald Trump's first national security adviser, Michael Flynn, didn't make it a month. Still, compared with failed nominees John Tower (George H.W. Bush's first choice for defense secretary), Zoe Baird and Kimba Wood (Clinton's first and second choices for attorney general), and now my friend and the latest victim of Beltway ritual sacrifice, Andrew Puzder, Flynn's imprint on actual executive branch history seems monumental.
After all, Flynn helped Trump assemble an impressive national security team that includes Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly, CIA Director Mike Pompeo and the nominee for director of national intelligence, Dan Coats. Flynn left his mark, even if his quick exit was uncomfortable for all and mysterious to most. He is a highly respected warrior, and his battlefield gifts are unquestioned, but those skill sets don't always transition well to the political world.
Is his departure a crisis for the Trump presidency? One greater or smaller than the enjoined executive order on immigration? Will either episode matter much when the histories of the Trump years pile up in a decade or so? Or will both — as I suspect — pale in comparison to the nomination and expected confirmation of Judge Neil Gorsuch for the Supreme Court?
Some are very worried. "We have allies that are just scared to death," former Secretary of State James Baker has noted, referring to some of Trump's early rhetoric and unpredictable foreign policy moves. Baker is the wise old hand's wise old hand. Only former White House counsel Fred Fielding booking a long-term vacation in New Zealand would be more disconcerting to the permanent class. But is the concern of serious people — much less the hysteria of the long-overlooked-but-eager-for-relevance, or the bayings of the defeated-looking-for-revenge — real or just nervousness at something completely new?
History isn't much help in judging early episodes. Does anything George W. Bush did in his first nine months before 9/11 matter much compared with what followed that awful day?
Justice Robert Jackson, in his famous opinion in the case that rejected President Harry Truman's attempt to seize control of the steel industry during the Korean War, warned that precedents and history just don't tell us much sometimes.
"That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has served as legal advisor to a President in time of transition and public anxiety," Jackson wrote in 1952's Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer.