Why did we, friendly rivals as deans of great and sometimes competitive law schools, join forces to write a common brief to the U.S. Supreme Court?
Because we both believe that higher education should select the best possible students, because we both believe we can identify such students only if we are free to evaluate the individual experiences and qualifications of each applicant, and because we both believe that this requires us to understand applicants' own characterizations of their race or ethnicity.
We joined forces because the Supreme Court is to hear oral argument Wednesday in Fisher v. University of Texas, a case in which some urge the court to require institutions of higher education, such as ours, to disregard individualized considerations of race.
In our personal view, this would be a tragedy for legal education and for higher education generally.
Our reasoning is simple. We admit students to accomplish two goals: to get the best possible students and to assemble the best possible class. These goals require us to examine each applicant in detail.
We assess applicants according to many dimensions. We look for talent and intellectual quality. But we also look for character; for virtues such as curiosity, flexibility, judgment, drive, determination and a commitment to use the advantages of one's education to give back to society.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders." The character of our students is relevant to the quality of our leaders. Character is most often revealed in the life circumstances of our applicants. We look to see how candidates have responded to the challenges they have faced.
Not infrequently these qualities have a racial dimension. While race may not matter for some applicants, for others it may be urgently salient. As deans, we do not prejudge this issue. Rather, our point is that race can be an important, if not essential, aspect of the life story of many applicants and that our ability to assess the individual character of these applicants would be crippled by a rule forbidding us from considering applicants' race.