President Obama hosted a screening of Steven Spielberg's "Lincoln" at the White House the other day. He should do it again and again and again.
For the subsequent showings, though, the president ought to invite every member of Congress. Have them settle into the plush red seats of the White House theater and mull the possibilities, for landmark greatness or epic failure, available to a second-term president and a lame-duck Congress.
"Lincoln" is exquisitely crafted and even more exquisitely timed. Focused on Lincoln's battle to win House passage of the 13th Amendment, it presents useful lessons in the subtle arts of presidential leadership and the practice of politics, at once grimy and sublime.
Dealing with the fast-approaching "fiscal cliff" is not a national crisis on the order of abolishing slavery. The country is limping out of a recession, not embroiled in a bloody civil war.
Still, "Lincoln" offers lessons in the canny exercise of authority -- the utility of the presidential office for congressional ego-stroking; the hidden, often grubby, levers of persuasion; the awesome force of a chief executive "clothed with immense power," as Lincoln described the office.
"Lincoln" is a case study in presidential lobbying. To pass the 13th Amendment, the president needs to flip at least 20 Democratic votes in the House -- to win over, as Secretary of State William Seward colorfully put it, the "same gang of talentless hicks and hacks who rejected the amendment" months earlier. Sound familiar?
At the start of "Lincoln," the first couple is planning a reception for members of Congress and other dignitaries. It is, Lincoln tells his wife, "a necessary hindrance." Mary Lincoln deduces her husband's hidden agenda: the 13th Amendment. "Why else would you force me to invite demented radicals into my home?" she concludes in an assessment that perhaps resonated with the current occupants.
There is an obstinate naiveté to the common assertions that more assiduous congressional stroking on Obama's part would have guaranteed better results during his first term. The president confronted a united opposition bent on denying him re-election; if anything, there were times -- for example, negotiations over health care reform -- when he erred on the side of assuming that too much could be achieved by reasonable people reasoning together.