On Sept. 11, 2001, Al-Qaida terrorists murdered 3,000 innocent civilians on American soil while under the sanctuary of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In response to that attack, U.S. and NATO forces deployed to Afghanistan to hunt down those responsible and ensure that Afghanistan would never again be a haven for terrorists. Since then, more than 2,000 Americans and more than 1,000 troops from our NATO allies have given their lives to that mission.
But after more than a decade-and-a-half of war, Gen. John W. Nicholson, commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last month that the war in Afghanistan is in a stalemate. President Trump and his administration must treat Afghanistan with the same urgency as the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or this stalemate risks sliding into strategic failure.
This month, two simultaneous suicide attacks by the Taliban in Kabul killed at least 16 people and wounded more than 40. In northern Afghanistan, the Taliban overran another district. These setbacks came on the heels of disturbing losses across the country. Nicholson recently confirmed an inspector general report that the Afghan government controls or influences just 57 percent of the country's districts, down from 72 percent just more than a year ago.
Make no mistake: Afghans are fighting ferociously to defend their country from our common enemies. At the same time, we must recognize that the U.S. is still at war in Afghanistan against the terrorist enemies who attacked our nation on Sept. 11 and their ideological heirs. We must act accordingly.
Unfortunately, in recent years, we have tied the hands of our military in Afghanistan. Instead of trying to win, we have settled for just trying not to lose.
Time and time again, we saw troop withdrawals that seemed to have more to do with U.S. politics than conditions on the ground. The fixation with "force management levels" in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq and Syria, seemed more about measuring troop counts than measuring success.
Authorities were also tightly restricted. Until last summer, our military was prohibited from targeting the Taliban, except in the most extreme circumstances, taking the pressure off the militants and allowing them to rebuild and reattack. Indeed, while we were fighting the ISIS, the authorities in Afghanistan were so restrictive that it took an entire year before U.S. forces were finally given authority to strike the group's fighters in Afghanistan.
While we have settled for a "don't lose" strategy, the risk to U.S. and Afghan forces has only grown worse as the terrorist threat has intensified.