Populism has become a defining feature of public life. It embraces a narrative of victimhood and grievance, pitting "people" against "elites." President Donald Trump's protectionism and hostility toward immigrants are fueled by populist frustration on the political right. On the left, populism appears as resentment of the wealthy, and the Democratic Party's presidential primary field is marked by proposals to penalize the rich. Compromise has become a dirty word. Political engagement with the other side is scorned. Taking half a loaf is worse than failure; it is betrayal.
How much longer will this last?
Economics has something to say on that question. In a 2016 paper, the German economists Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch studied the political ramifications of financial crises. They built and analyzed a data set covering more than 800 elections in 20 advanced economies (including the U.S.) running from 1870 to 2014.
They found that far-right parties see a 30% increase in their vote share in the five years following a financial crisis. The parties that gain are characterized by nationalist and xenophobic oratory. The most recent financial crisis fit this pattern, with right-wing populist parties more than doubling their vote share after 2008 in France, the U.K., Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Japan.
Particularly since World War II, the economists found, crises make governing more difficult and are associated with shrinking majorities for the party in power, a strengthening of political opposition and greater political fractionalization. The number of parties represented in parliaments increases. Since 1950, more than one additional party, on average, has entered the legislature in the five-year period following a financial crisis. Street protests, riots and strikes occur more often.
In contrast, recessions that are not caused by financial crises see relatively little of this. The economists suggest that nonfinancial downturns — think of an oil-price shock — may be seen by voters as excusable, out of the control of elites. Financial recessions, on the other hand, may be perceived as the result of policy failures and other elite decisions.
In addition, the measures used to combat financial recessions — central banks purchasing long-term assets, for example — are unusual, and may reduce confidence in government. Bailouts associated with financial crises may also be a source of populist angst, and financial recessions might cause ugly disputes between debtors and creditors that erode the social fabric.
The good news from the economists' paper is that the political upheaval caused by a financial crisis is temporary. Ten years after a crisis, nearly all the variables they study are back to their pre-crisis levels.