The job of a judge is to follow the law. If we are to be, as Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "a government of laws, and not of men," lower courts must carefully apply the precedent of the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, the top criminal court in my home state of Texas is not following this foundational constitutional principle — in a matter of life and death.
Last year, in a case involving a death-row prisoner named Bobby Moore, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Texas' framework for determining whether a capital defendant had an intellectual disability — and was therefore exempt from execution — violated the Eighth Amendment. The rejected Texas criteria had in some circles become known as "the Lennie standard" because it invited the courts to compare the defendant with the fictional character Lennie Small in John Steinbeck's "Of Mice and Men" — a giant man with the mind of a child.
With respect to Moore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wrongly relied on nonclinical criteria about intellectual disability to uphold his death sentence. Three justices dissented from the court's reversal. But as all justices agree, the Supreme Court's majority decision is the law of the land. And all justices unanimously agreed that the Texas court' use of lay stereotypes was erroneous and unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court's majority opinion emphasized that, as a 13-year-old, Moore lacked a basic understanding of the days of the week, the months of the year, telling time, the seasons and the concept that subtraction is the reverse of addition. Stressing that Moore's serious mental and social difficulties were clear from early childhood, the court highlighted what it called "the considerable objective evidence of Moore's adaptive deficits." The majority also held that Moore's IQ is well within the range of intellectual disability, an issue that is no longer in dispute.
As is customary, the Supreme Court then sent the case back to the Texas court for further proceedings.
If the system were working as it should, Moore's case would have been a routine matter of the Texas court applying the Supreme Court's decision and current medical standards as directed and prohibiting Moore's execution. Even the prosecutors who had obtained the death penalty against Moore agreed in a formal filing to the Texas court that, in light of the controlling medical and legal standards, Moore is intellectually disabled and should not be executed.
Yet in a stark conflict with black letter law, the state appellate court again ruled that Moore is not intellectually disabled and set him on course for execution. The decision made reference to the Supreme Court's ruling, but for the second time relied on lay stereotypes and nonclinical criteria — despite the Supreme Court's explicit instructions.