Editorial: Prepare 'Plan B' for Mideast peace talks

It was a great White House photo op: President Obama, flanked by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, kicking off the Mideast peace process with hearty handshakes and reassuring rhetoric about the thaw between Israel and Palestine.

But that thaw depended on the freeze on Israeli settlements in disputed West Bank land continuing beyond 10 months. Instead, it was lifted on Sunday, as Netanyahu had vowed it would be. Now both sides must reevaluate long-held positions that have stalled the peace process for so many years.

For Israel, "it is a read-my-lips moment," Michael B. Oren, Israeli ambassador to the United States, told the New York Times. "This establishes credibility, not just for the Israelis but for the Palestinians. Establishing that the man [Netanyahu] is true to his word is going to be a very important asset going forward."

The problem is that Abbas also made a pledge, saying from the beginning that if Israel lifted the settlement ban, he would leave the talks. So for one man to establish credibility, another has to lose it.

Netanyahu knew this, yet still proceeded to placate his governing coalition partners -- particularly Israel's far-right religious parties.

Conversely, Abbas, who is far weaker politically, has lost ground with his domestic constituency, the more moderate Palestinians in the West Bank. The response was even harsher from Abbas' rival for Palestinian leadership, Hamas, which governs Gaza. Its spokesman called resuming direct negotiations "a crime against the Palestinian people."

Meanwhile, Obama looks naive. His administration gambled that it could convince Netanyahu to extend the freeze in the interests of the peace process. Or that Abbas, however humiliated, would choose to continue the conversation.

But now that the process has started, it's imperative to try to keep it on track. Each of the major players must make moves that require sacrifice.

Netanyahu still could choose a 'Nixon goes to China' moment, since he is the one Israeli leader with the conservative credentials to convince zealous settlers that continued building is counterproductive to Israel's national security. Indeed, it's particularly crucial that Israel build international support to stop Iran's nascent nuclear weapons program. Derailing the peace process with settlement expansion further isolates Israel from necessary allies, which in turn emboldens Tehran.

Abbas has already, at least temporarily, made a sacrifice by delaying a decision on quitting the talks. Instead he's turning to the Arab League to get consensus, and cover, for his next step.

As for Obama, he now needs to be ready to risk a direct rebuff by offering a peace plan of its own, as opposed to merely midwifing one. It needn't, and shouldn't, be a blueprint of a block-by-block West Bank land swap, but instead should be a specific set of principles on all key issues.

Offering an American peace plan could change the dynamic to one in which each side needs to respond to the United States, rather than only each other. Saying 'no' to America, which each side needs as an ally, would be much harder.