Recently, I've been rereading "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich." In this political season, William L. Shirer's mammoth history of Hitler's Germany seems a useful guide to how a skilled demagogue can seize and destroy a great nation.
Hitler's rise, as narrated by Shirer, was the triumph of an unlikely messiah — "the man with the Charlie Chaplin mustache, who had been a down-and-out tramp in Vienna in his youth, an unknown soldier, the somewhat comical leader of the Beer Hall Putsch, this spellbinder." How did this preposterous upstart bend one of the most cultured of nations to his will?
He did it partly through the ballot box. In the early 1930s, Hitler's National Socialist Party, the Nazis, rose through a series of free elections. It never won a majority in any of them, but emerged as the strongest of several parties in the Reichstag, or parliament. Hitler then connived his way to the office of chancellor, or prime minister, playing on the vanity, foolishness, ambition and greed of non-Nazis to outmaneuver them all.
"No class or group or party in Germany could escape its share of responsibility for the abandonment of the democratic Republic and the advent of Adolf Hitler," Shirer wrote. "The cardinal error of the Germans who opposed Nazism was their failure to unite against it."
Hitler never got more than 37 percent of the vote. "But the 63 percent of the German people who expressed their opposition to Hitler were much too divided and shortsighted to combine against a common danger which they must have known would overwhelm them unless they united, however temporarily, to stamp it out."
Hitler's rise owed everything to the 1929 stock market crash and the global Depression that followed it. Under the Republic, Germany had begun to recover from its defeat in World War I. Then, suddenly, "millions were thrown out of work. Thousands of small business enterprises went under."
According to Shirer, Hitler "was both ignorant of and uninterested in economics. But he was not uninterested in or ignorant of the opportunities which the Depression suddenly gave him. The suffering of his fellow Germans was not something to waste time sympathizing with, but rather to transform, coldbloodedly and immediately, into political support for his own ambition."
Hitler played on this in the 1930 election, when the Nazis became the second biggest party. "To all the millions of discontented, Hitler in a whirlwind campaign offered what seemed to them, in their misery, some measure of hope. He would make Germany strong again … stamp out corruption, bring the money barons to heel (especially if they were Jews), and see to it that every German had a job and bread. To hopeless, hungry men seeking not only relief but new faith and new gods, the appeal was not without effect."
