The way that black holes bend light's path through space cannot be smoothed out by human ingenuity. By contrast, a vast distortion in the world economy is wholly man-made. It is the subsidy that governments give to debt.
Half the rich world's governments allow their citizens to deduct the interest payments on mortgages from their taxable income; almost all countries allow firms to write off payments on their borrowing against taxable earnings.
It sounds prosaic, but the cost — and the harm — is immense.
In 2007, before the financial crisis led to the slashing of interest rates, the annual value of the forgone tax revenues in Europe was around 3 percent of GDP — or $510 billion — and in America almost 5 percent of GDP — or $725 billion. That means governments on both sides of the Atlantic were spending more on cheapening the cost of debt than on defense. Even today, with interest rates close to zero, America's debt subsidies cost the federal government over 2 percent of GDP — as much as it spends on all its policies to help the poor.
This hardly begins to capture the full damage, which is aggravated by the behavior the tax breaks encourage. People borrow more to buy property than they otherwise would, raising house prices and encouraging overinvestment in real estate instead of in assets that create wealth. The tax benefits are largely reaped by the rich, worsening inequality. Corporate financial decisions are motivated by maximizing the tax relief on debt instead of the needs of the underlying business.
Debt has many wonderful qualities — allowing firms to invest and individuals to benefit today from tomorrow's income. But the tax subsidies have tilted the economy in a woeful direction. They have created a financial system that is prone to crises and biased against productive investment; they have reduced economic growth and worsened inequality. They are a man-made distortion and they need to be fixed.
Start with the fragility. Economies biased toward debt are more prone to crises, because debt imposes a rigid obligation to repay on vulnerable borrowers, whereas equity is expressly designed to spread losses onto investors. Firms without significant equity buffers are more likely to go broke, banks more likely to topple.
The dot-com crash in 2000-02 caused losses to shareholders worth $4 trillion — and a mild recession. Leveraged global banks notched up losses of $2 trillion in 2007-10 — and the world economy imploded. Financial regulators have already gone some way to redressing the balance from debt by forcing the banks to fund themselves with more equity. But the bias remains — in large part because of the subsidy for debt.