New, old Osprey information

The circuitous route the Osprey took to production is detailed in this 2004 story from the Fort Worth Star-Telegram's Bob Cox. Among the key findings: In early tests of the V-22, pilots weren't allowed to perform some serious maneuvers because of fears they would damge the aircraft; important mechanical components continued to fail; and there was concerns about pilots having trouble making a controlled emergency landing in helicopter mode after engine failure. Interesting reading.

V-22: READY FOR COMBAT?
Pilots question whether the Osprey is able to perform the maneuvers needed in battle
By Bob Cox
Star-Telegram Staff Writer

The V-22 Osprey carrying 20 Marines descends swiftly, approaching the small landing zone a few hundred feet below. Suddenly, enemy fire erupts from a clump of rocks and trees.

As tracer rounds arc through the darkness, the pilot makes an instinctive decision: abort. He applies full power, banks sharply and starts to climb into a U-turn.

Does he make it out? Can the aircraft perform this combat maneuver?

That's anybody's guess. Test pilots were not allowed to try such extreme maneuvers in the V-22, the helicopter/airplane hybrid being built for the military by Fort Worth-based Bell Helicopter and Boeing's Pennsylvania-based helicopter unit.

Program officials feared the maneuvers would damage the aircraft.

"The tactical implications of this limitation have been carefully considered and will continue to be reviewed," he said.
Military officials and their counterparts at Bell and Boeing say they have made significant progress in correcting the V-22's flaws in the four years since 23 Marines died in two crashes. But whether the aircraft can maneuver sharply in combat is one of several questions still unanswered on the eve of a crucial series of tests.

If the tests go well, the Marines will try to persuade the Pentagon to spend billions of dollars to buy more than 450 of the next-generation aircraft, which are designed to replace conventional helicopters that haul troops and cargo to combat zones.

The stakes are high. Thousands of Marines may someday be asked to trust their lives to the aircraft, which supporters bill as a key weapon in the war on terror. The V-22, they say, can fly higher, faster and farther than helicopters.

"This aircraft will totally differentiate how things will happen" in battle, said Mike Redenbaugh, chief executive of Bell Helicopter of Fort Worth.

Fort Worth and Texas have a huge stake in the program. About 2,500 people at Bell plants in Fort Worth, Arlington and Grand Prairie and hundreds more in Amarillo produce the V-22, which accounted for about a third of Bell's $1.75 billion in sales in 2003.

"The V-22 won't do the mission it was designed to do," said Bill Lawrence, a former helicopter pilot in Vietnam who was once assigned to oversee the V-22 test program. He retired in 1989, before testing began.

"For Christie's office to come right out and say that they didn't do the testing simply means they absolutely know the V-22 cannot operate where the average Marine combat pilot is going to have to take it in order to survive," Lawrence said.

The issues include:
• It remains unclear whether the V-22 can perform all the maneuvers that several pilots said are necessary in combat, including sudden evasive tactics, fast descents and emergency landings. Program managers say that the aircraft is more maneuverable than conventional helicopters and that pilots should have no problems as long as they follow the flight manual.
• Important mechanical components continue to fail, reinforcing long-standing concerns about reliability and maintenance costs. Program officials say the parts are becoming more reliable as refinements are made.
• The V-22 might have only one significant performance advantage over helicopters: speed. A 2002 study prepared for the Air Force says V-22 supporters have exaggerated its capabilities. Program officials say the study is inaccurate.
Bell Helicopter has been working on what is known as "tilt-rotor" technology since the 1950s. The Pentagon funded development of the V-22 in 1981. The aircraft combines the vertical takeoff and landing attributes of a helicopter with the greater speed and range of an airplane. Two wing-mounted engines can rotate from vertical for takeoff and landing to horizontal for flight.

Air Force Col. Craig Olson, the V-22 program manager, said the aircraft's technical problems "are mostly behind us." The Bell/Boeing team must concentrate on reducing the $74 million production cost, improving reliability and cutting maintenance expenses, he said.

Cost is certainly a problem, said Charles Pena, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in Washington, D.C. The V-22, he said, was sold as a "quantum-leap vehicle," but in many respects is "only marginally better" than current helicopters.

"The operational test ... is critical," John Young, assistant Navy secretary, said about the new round of testing, which is scheduled to begin in January. "Every sign I see is, they're very ready for that."

Marine Col. Glenn Walters, commander of the test squadron, said the V-22 will be tested thoroughly. His team of Marine pilots based at Marine Corps Air Station New River in North Carolina will try to determine how far the V-22 can fly, how much weight it can carry and how well it performs various missions. It's unclear whether pilots will attempt the maneuvers skipped in the earlier tests.

"We're making sure everything is done correctly, so when it gets to the fleet, there's no glitches," Walters said.
Old problem, new twist

Pilots in Vietnam learned that a key to survival was taking advantage of a helicopter's agility. They flew steep, corkscrewing descents into landing zones. They juked wildly, changing directions abruptly, and often hugged the treetops.

"I'm sure at the time we were pushing them beyond the limits of the aircraft's design, but they could do it," Lawrence said.

But the skipped flight tests and restrictions on aggressive maneuvers are not good signs, he said.

"I'm sorry, but that's the way you're going to fly the airplane," said Lawrence, who has testified as an expert witness against Bell in litigation not involving the V-22.

Lawrence's views reflect those of several former military pilots who have questioned the V-22's ability to make evasive maneuvers in helicopter mode. The combat veterans have expressed their concerns to the Star-Telegram as well as on Internet bulletin boards and in letters to the Pentagon.

But Tom MacDonald, Boeing's chief V-22 test pilot, said he is confident in the aircraft.

"We don't feel there are going to be any limitations on maneuvering this airplane reasonably," he said. "Everything you fly has some limits."

When the pilot descended rapidly and attempted a turn, the aircraft was apparently caught in its own wake. A rotor stalled, causing the V-22 to roll and plunge to the ground.

Some veteran pilots and aviation scientists said the accident exposed an inability in the V-22 to descend rapidly and abruptly change directions, key requirements for combat aircraft. Aerodynamic experts advising Christie and his predecessor, Philip Coyle, argued for additional tests. The Government Accountability Office, a government watchdog agency, called for "realistic" tests.

Some testing was done. But a series involving specific, sharp defensive maneuvers was skipped after Bell engineers warned that it would severely damage the rotors, according to a source within the testing program who asked not to be identified for fear of losing his job.

Several people told the Star-Telegram that the canceled tests are important.

"If they were so afraid of breaking the aircraft that they didn't dare try these maneuvers, what will they do in battle?" asked Coyle, who is now a consultant to the Center for Defense Information, a group often critical of Pentagon spending plans.

"Part of our job is to make sure these things happen and fix them," he said.

Combat maneuverability was one of the main concerns of Pete Aldridge, Wynne's predecessor as the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer. Before a May 2003 meeting, Christie said additional maneuver tests were planned. But, after Aldridge approved the test program's results at the meeting, program officials said there would be no further maneuver testing.

"We've proved the airplane for safety," Carroll said.

Aldridge did not respond to a message left at his home seeking comment on the skipped tests.

Bell and program officials say the V-22 has no problems with combat maneuvers. They say that its speed and other capabilities will make it less vulnerable than helicopters. Flying low and fast, the V-22 won't present much of a target, said Walters, the Marine pilot. "We don't even have to go into a hover" to land, he said.

"If you're going to use it for combat, you've got to assume you're going to get shot at," said Chuck Carlock of Fort Worth, who flew helicopters for the Army in Vietnam. "And if you're getting shot at, you've got to be able ... to do some pretty violent things with the aircraft."

Pilots will be trained to avoid the aerodynamic problem, referred to in shorthand as VRS, by not descending too rapidly, said Olson, the program manager.

"If you nibble on VRS, you'll know it right away," Walters said. The aircraft shakes and vibrates severely several seconds before it begins to roll, he said. Program officials developed instruments that will warn pilots if they're approaching the danger zone.

Christie said the V-22's response to the problem "should be avoidable if pilots fly within the constraints" laid out in the flight manual. Program officials also say that pilots can recover by switching to airplane mode and flying out of the turbulent air.

But, if a pilot runs into trouble close to the ground -- the area where it's most likely to occur -- Olson and others acknowledge that there's probably not enough time to recover.

Original plans called for the aircraft to perform an "autorotation," a technique in which helicopter pilots rely on continued rotor movement after a power loss to land safely.

The Pentagon dropped the requirement after tests found that the V-22's rotors were too small. Program officials say the requirement is unnecessary because the engines are extremely reliable.

But Coyle and others point out that military aircraft are subject to great stresses and unforeseen events. Combat helicopters, for example, sometimes run out of fuel before they're able to return to base.

Program officials say that the V-22 can switch to airplane mode and fly for a time after the loss of one engine or try to glide down after the loss of both. To glide, however, pilots must have enough altitude and speed and must find a suitable landing spot.

And they would have to be good: They would come down almost as fast as a jet fighter.

Military requirements call for the V-22 to be more reliable and less costly to maintain than the Vietnam-era CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters it is supposed to replace.

So far, it hasn't met those standards, although program officials say they are getting closer.

In a first round of testing in 1999 and 2000, V-22 pilots were forced to abort missions because of mechanical problems more than three times as often as CH-46 pilots, according to a report prepared by Coyle's office.
"The reliability of the V-22 ... does not meet its requirement," Coyle wrote.

A Marine officer was later convicted of altering maintenance and repair records in an attempt to make the V-22 look better.

Top Marine officers overseeing the program, as well as Bell and Boeing officials, said the problems were typical growing pains associated with any new aircraft. They told Congress and Defense Department officials that reliability would improve with time.

Flight-critical rotor-control parts that cost $90,000 each and that were supposed to last 1,500 to 2,000 hours were being replaced more frequently.

In addition, Bell discovered faulty hydraulic tubing supplied by one manufacturer. A new contractor was hired, but documents show that tubing made by the original contractor was still aboard the newest V-22s delivered to the Marines in April.

As recently as June, V-22s in the flight test program had three serious mechanical problems. In one, an engine lost fuel and shut down while on the ground, a problem attributed to two separate malfunctions.

Another V-22 made two emergency landings within 10 days after critical components failed. The second incident occurred when a blower that cools hydraulic fluid disintegrated in midair; the pilot had three minutes to land before the entire hydraulic system failed.

Program officials initially downplayed the failed blower as an isolated incident. But other blowers showed unexpected wear, and officials decided to replace them every 70 hours of flight until more durable ones can be designed.
Walters' test squadron has been receiving new aircraft from the Bell factory in Amarillo since late last year. The Marines have flown hundreds of hours in the updated V-22s, and officials say maintenance performance has improved, although they declined to supply new data.

Exaggerated claims?

The V-22 is twice as fast as conventional helicopters, carries three times the payload and has six times the range.
For two decades, the Marines and other advocates have helped maintain political support for the program with this powerful mantra.

But the claims are misleading, according to a report prepared for the Air Force by retired Col. Everest Riccioni. By "conventional helicopters," supporters mean the CH-46s. The comparison is meaningless, Riccioni says, "because the CH-46 is a small, light helicopter ... and relatively obsolete."

Newer helicopters compare favorably to the V-22 and cost far less, said Riccioni, who was among the Air Force officers who pushed for development of the F-16 fighter in the 1960s.

His report, conducted in 2002 and obtained by the Star-Telegram, is the most recent -- if not the only -- study that examines claims about the V-22 in detail. It was ordered by Ernest Fitzgerald, a civilian cost analyst for the Air Force who has spent more than three decades ruffling feathers in the Pentagon by criticizing the costs and performance of new military aircraft.

For example, the V-22's speed advantage is severely compromised when it flies low, a common tactic to avoid radar. Flying high in airplane mode, a loaded V-22 cruises at about 288 mph, compared with about 173 mph for helicopters. But the V-22 slows to about 196 mph at low altitudes, Riccioni wrote.

In addition, modern helicopters can fly farther and transport more troops faster than the same number of V-22s, Riccioni concluded.

When loaded with cargo or 24 troops, the V-22 has a documented round-trip range of about 460 miles. The Marines' CH-53 helicopters can fly about 552 miles carrying 35 to 45 troops. The newer US101 helicopter, which carries at least as many troops as the V-22, can fly more than 690 miles. All three aircraft can be refueled in midair.

Additionally, Riccioni wrote, a V-22 carrying a significant quantity of troops or cargo cannot make a vertical landing at high altitudes because of its small rotors. That would render it nearly useless in mountainous environments such as Afghanistan, where U.S. troops are battling remnants of the ousted Taliban regime that harbored Osama bin Laden.
Riccioni's findings contradict a May 2003 briefing prepared by the Lexington Institute, a think tank supported by the defense industry. The V-22 can fly "to ranges far beyond what helicopters can achieve," according to the institute, which offered no supporting data.

"It is the ideal aircraft for carrying personnel and cargo any place where airstrip availability is uncertain," including bin Laden's mountain hide-outs, the briefing says.

"We didn't do anything with it," said Maj. Stephanie Holcomb, a spokeswoman.

Carroll, the V-22 program office spokesman, characterized the report as "unpublished" and full of inaccurate assumptions. He offered no specific counters to Riccioni's assertions.

Riccioni's study disputed another powerful argument made by V-22 supporters: that its speed and range would have made it the perfect aircraft to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran in 1980.

Marine officers routinely give presentations showing how a small force of V-22s could have transported a 100-man rescue force and plucked the hostages from Tehran in eight hours, compared with 32 hours for conventional helicopters.

"Jimmy Carter might have been re-elected," said Walters, the test squadron commander. Many say the ill-fated rescue attempt helped cost the president the 1980 election.

"The Marine depiction of the mission is a complete distortion of reality," he wrote.