In the fall of 1983, when I was a DJ at the Carleton College radio station, I opened a package from Radio Moscow. It was a propaganda tape, denouncing the NATO plan to deploy Pershing II missiles in western Europe. I played the droning voice over a dance track on the air and thought it was hilarious.

If I've learned anything from "The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy," David E. Hoffman's new history of the last years of the Cold War, it's that the tape was no joke. The Soviet leadership had nearly panicked over the short flight time of the Pershing II, which might allow the United States to launch a decapitating first strike. The Kremlin began to search for an automated launch system to guarantee retaliation -- a doomsday device, nicknamed the Dead Hand. That Radio Moscow tape reflected a larger crisis that brought the world terrifyingly close to a nuclear holocaust.

Hoffman rarely releases the tension in this taut, crisply written book, as he ranges from the start of the Reagan administration through the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. This richly reported account vividly chronicles the insanity of the arms race and the efforts made on both sides to end it.

I use the term "reported" deliberately. Hoffman is a veteran journalist, and this book demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of his profession -- though mostly the strengths. It gives full play to the leaders, but the heart of the book lies in its account of the Soviet war machine's middle managers -- engineers, scientists, advisers, military officers and others. "The Dead Hand" puts human faces on the bureaucracy of mutual assured destruction, even as it underscores the institutional inertia that drove this monster forward.

Hoffman provides a particularly chilling account of Biopreparat, the Soviets' massive biological warfare program. We read of otherwise normal researchers who got caught up in the challenges of designing pathogens and bridled against meddling superiors, forgetting the horror of the final product. Gorbachev seems to have had limited control over this immense enterprise, and never admitted to its existence.

But Hoffman's approach has weaknesses, as well. I found myself wishing for a matching look at the inside of the U.S. military-industrial complex, as well as an overarching analysis of the arms race, neither of which he provides. He weaves in a ripping account of the spy game, featuring surprise defections and deadly treason, but he is less convincing in arguing for the spooks' significance. In his own telling, the leaders on both sides listened more to their preconceptions than to intelligence, good or bad.

Such quibbles, though, should not obscure the fact that this is a fine book indeed -- revealing, alarming and compelling throughout.

T.J. Stiles, a native of Foley, Minn., is the author of "The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Van- derbilt," published this year by Alfred A. Knopf.