In his book "Presidential Leadership and the Creation of the America Era," Joseph Nye of Harvard University divided American presidents into two groups. One is made up of "transformational" leaders — those with the grandiose goal of using American influence to spread democracy and liberty around the world. Think of Reagan and Bush-the-son. The second group contains "transactional" leaders — pragmatists who have modest goals, like Eisenhower or Bush-the-father.
In the postcolonial era, Egypt has been consistently ruled by "accidental" leaders — generally military men who lacked any political vision or leadership skill. Their mediocrity was the key to their survival under a dictatorial system. These leaders, who suddenly found themselves in charge of Egypt, suffered from what I call the second-man syndrome.
They are usually insecure and mostly steer away from challenging the status quo. They come from the rank and file of the existing system. They take power by chance, with no popular base of support. They become paranoid, don't trust anyone and spend most of their leadership tenure trying to survive and stay in power. They start fighting imaginary enemies, become less and less democratic, and eventually emerge as full-fledged dictators.
It started in 1952, with the Free Officers coup, which toppled the last monarch and produced the first Egyptian president — the uncharismatic Gen. Muhammad Naguib. He was a figurehead, a second man to the real leader, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the brains of the Free Officers revolution. In 1956, Nasser removed Naguib and took over the government.
When Nasser died of a heart attack in 1970, the country was not ready for his early departure. To many he was a national hero who had given Egyptians a sense of purpose and a new national identity. But he had never been fond of sharing power; he hadn't groomed any successor.
Anwar Sadat was a second thought, someone who hadn't shown any leadership tendencies during Nasser's rule. The "yes man" of Nasser, he was called by most Egyptians. But Sadat was in the right place at the right time. He was the head of the lower parliament, a token institution where he made sure members rubber-stamped Nasser's outlandish policy decisions.
Sadat didn't waste any time. He courted the Islamists to counter the opposition from the left, which had flourished during Nasser's rule, and gradually removed any trace of Nasser's legacy, or any threat to his absolute power.
After Sadat's assassination in 1981 came President Hosni Mubarak, another young military man. He was the "yes man" for Sadat. He, too, was in the right place at the right time — sitting next to Sadat in the infamous military parade stand.
