Members of Congress would rather kick the can down the road than eat their spinach.
Washington – Since the end of World War II, more than a dozen high-profile bipartisan panels have been convened to tackle the nation’s thorniest fiscal problems. Seldom have their recommendations spurred congressional action. Their ambitious, high-octane reports and recommendations are mostly gathering dust on government shelves.
Right now, congressional negotiators are struggling with a way to head off another looming government shutdown and debt ceiling crisis that could strike early next year. A 29-member bipartisan panel faces a Dec. 13 deadline and daunting odds.
History is not on its side.
A bipartisan “supercommittee” assigned to find ways to cut the federal deficit by at least $1.2 trillion over 10 years crashed, burned and expired last November.
“We end this process united in our belief that the nation’s fiscal crisis must be addressed and that we cannot leave it for the next generation to solve,” its leaders, Rep. Jeb Hensarling, R-Texas, and Sen. Patty Murray, D-Wash., said in a joint statement of frustration.
A 2010-2011 deficit-reduction panel led by former Sen. Alan Simpson, R-Wyo., and Democrat Erskine Bowles, a former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton, produced a comprehensive deficit-cutting plan that was widely praised but mostly ignored, even by President Obama, who created the group. Simpson called the plan “the only one that irritates everybody” and therefore “the only one that will work.”
Plaudits but little support
Proposing a batch of highly detailed government spending cuts and tax increases, the recommendations won many bipartisan plaudits but little support from either party.
It failed, Simpson later suggested, because Democratic and Republican lawmakers alike “all worship the god of re-election.”
The Grace Commission was created in 1982 by President Ronald Reagan to go after waste and inefficiency in the federal government. Headed by businessman J. Peter Grace, the commission produced hefty recommendations it claimed would save the government $424 billion over three years. Reagan and Congress largely ignored its report.
One of the few special panels generally hailed as a success is the 1981-83 Social Security commission chaired by Republican economist Alan Greenspan, who later served for 19 years as Federal Reserve chairman under four different presidents. His panel is widely credited with rescuing the old-age benefit program from insolvency.
It recommended an increase in the Social Security payroll tax, trimming some benefits, especially for younger retirees, and gradually raising the retirement age for full benefits. For once, Congress went along. But it was hardly a smooth ride.
The panel quickly deadlocked, with Democrats opposing benefit cuts and Republicans opposing higher Social Security taxes. It came up with its big fix only after the direct, heavy intervention by Reagan and House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill, D-Mass.
Why the otherwise poor record for such major bipartisan panels?
“They never really accomplish anything because they’re substitutes for action,” said Bruce Bartlett, a former economic adviser to Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. “They give presidents and Congresses a way of appearing to be doing something substantive about a problem without actually doing anything.”
Bartlett isn’t optimistic about the current effort by congressional negotiators.
No incentive to compromise
Prince offered samples of a funky new solo album during an intimate late-night preview. He didn’t mention the album’s title or release date, but he did express frustration with the slow-grinding wheels of the record business.