The United States will not sacrifice a nation's freedom for stability, President Bush has stated repeatedly, a policy applied especially in Eastern Europe and the states that emerged from the Soviet Union. Well, we may not sacrifice freedom for stability -- but because of this policy, the nation of Georgia has sacrificed several dozen soldiers, several hundred civilians, much of its military equipment, and quite possibly any hope of ever bringing South Ossetia and Abkhazia back under the sway of the central government in Tbilisi. We have staked out our position clearly -- and have let others pay for implementing it. And now we are outraged. Perhaps we should also ask just what our brave words have wrought.

Let me be very clear at the outset -- I hold no brief for the regime in Moscow, and there can be no doubt that Russia has been manipulating the microstates of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to keep pressure on Georgia for many years. But the events of the past two weeks, and our inability to do anything serious to affect them, force us to consider two realities.

First, geography. Whatever we might like to think about the advance of freedom and democracy, history tells us repeatedly that large countries do not tolerate hostile small countries on their borders. This isn't fair or welcome -- for the small countries, that is; the large ones rather like it -- but it is fact. The United States has had such a policy since the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated in 1823. Even when the specific focus of President James Monroe -- foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere -- has not been the problem, we have found cause to invade Haiti, Cuba, Panama, Grenada, Nicaragua and more over the past several decades. We do not tolerate small hostile regimes in our neighborhood -- Cuba being the aggravating exception that proves the rule. Why are we surprised when Russia doesn't either?

Second, history. Much has been written in recent months about the famous book title "The End of History," which asserted that after the Cold War, democracy and Western values had won. There would be no more great divergence of political systems. Oh, well, it seemed a nice idea at the time. Its author, Francis Fukuyama, has since both recanted and said he was misunderstood. Russia has been a major force on the east side of Europe for at least 300 years. To think that ended in 1991 was, at best, naïve. And yet we have acted for the past 17 years, under both Democratic and Republican presidents, as if it were true. But history tells us otherwise. Russia has had periods of growth and weakness before -- as have other key countries, like China and India. A look at China during the Cultural Revolution could hardly have foreseen the juggernaut of today. We must accept that history continues, and in far more complex fashion than the one-direction model we seem to think functions.

None of this means that we should not help Georgia build its economy and democratic institutions, nor that Georgia should not be able to orient its policy as it chooses. But it does mean that we and Georgia must do that in ways that recognize the realities of geography and history. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili now essentially admits that he erred in sending Georgian troops into South Ossetia. We need to recognize our culpability for helping Georgia do what any student of the region knows is a very bad idea -- poking the Russian bear in the eye. This is not appeasement, but simple good sense, just as we have repeatedly leaned on Taiwan not to provoke Beijing unduly. Our goals for Georgia may be good ones -- but to borrow a word from the Bush administration's view of a timeline for withdrawal from Iraq, they are "aspirational." Aspirations must take account of realities on the ground before actions are taken. The United States failed to do that in Georgia, and our failure cost Georgia a great deal. We can do better than this -- but only if we recognize our errors and face reality.

William Davnie, of Minneapolis, is a retired Foreign Service officer.