When Shinzo Abe made the case, in late 2012, that he was the man to save the economy and revive Japan, voters handed him a landslide general-election win. Last week, just two years on, the prime minister dissolved the Diet's lower house and declared a snap election for Dec. 14. "We cannot," he thundered, "let this chance go." Not surprisingly, many Japanese think they are being asked to buy the same horse twice.

The political calculations are clear. Abe's popularity has tumbled from the gravity-defying levels he enjoyed until this autumn. Better to seek another four-year term now before fights next year over defense policy and restarting Japan's closed nuclear plants, and before mutterings against Abe grow inside his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The opposition is in disarray, unable even to field enough candidates for the vote. Observers expect the ruling coalition to lose 30-40 seats but still keep a handsome majority. Some of Abe's people hope that the LDP might actually add seats and govern without the help of Komeito, its junior partner.

Japan's back — in recession

Yet there is no getting around it. Abe is running on a promise to revive the economy because his attempts to do so the first time round have largely failed. Countless times he claimed to be putting an end to years of deflation and reviving the economy. The Economist was among those who gave him the benefit of the doubt by endorsing "Abenomics," a slickly presented campaign promoting radical monetary easing, more government spending and far-reaching structural reforms. Soon after he came to office, Abe famously declared that "Japan is back." As awful GDP figures released for the third quarter on Nov. 17 underlined, he was half-right: Japan is indeed back — in recession. And many Japanese households feel squeezed because wages are not keeping pace with prices.

Was Abenomics, then, all voodoo? Not entirely. Without the Bank of Japan's massive quantitative easing, who knows how far the economy might have sunk? The first round of easing in 2013 did nudge inflation expectations upward. Its second round in late October was also right, because the economy had stopped in its tracks.

As for fiscal policy, the problem was too little loosening. With hindsight, the government made a mistake in going ahead in April with a long-planned rise in the consumption (value-added) tax, from 5 percent to 8 percent. It knocked the stuffing out of the economy. Abe was right to declare last week that he will postpone the next planned rise, from October 2015 until April 2017 (though he was disingenuous in claiming that he needed a fresh electoral mandate to do so). In a stagnant economy, putting fiscal consolidation before recovery can prove disastrous.

Monetary and fiscal policy will remain loose after Abe is re-elected. Yet Abenomics may now pack less of a punch. Perhaps its chief intention, in the words of one adviser, was as a "psychology-management exercise" to boost the stock market and shake Japanese households and businesses out of their deflationary gloom. That effect cannot be repeated again and again.

Shinzo Abe’s popularity has tumbled since data showed an economy in contraction. Snap elections are likely to work in the ruling party’s favor.

Lack of urgency

That leaves structural reform, the third dimension to the plan to raise Japan's long-run rate of growth. Here, spin raced much further ahead of substance. The government announced fine-sounding proposals to improve a rigid employment system, open markets and even allow in more foreigners. A few of them have borne fruit: corporate governance is being overhauled to allow in more independent directors, more women are at work and agriculture is freer. But overall there has been no sense of urgency or priorities.

Abe's advisers say that a second term will be different: He will unblock trade talks with the U.S. over farm protection; he will reform labor; he will change the tax system to spur job creation and stimulate spending. He may also get a little help from the economy. Year-end bonuses at big companies are likely to be generous, thanks to profits from a weak yen. In Nagoya, for instance, wages for bar workers have doubled in the past year as construction firms have snapped up casual labor.

In the long run, however, Japan can grow faster only if it has a leader who is prepared to make changes that upset old ways of doing things. Abe has radical ideas, but he is too averse to spending his political capital to implement them. Great leaders have to take risks.

Copyright 2013 The Economist Newspaper Limited, London. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with permission.